

Studies on Themes and Motifs in Literature

Rewriting Texts
Remaking Images

Interdisciplinary Perspectives

Edited by
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and Ernesto Virgulti

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On Being a Modern Poet

R. Bruce Elder

For eighteen years, from 1975 to 1993, I worked on an extended cycle of films, collectively titled *The Book of All the Dead*, which drew on Dante Alighieri's *Commedia* and Ezra Pound's *Cantos*. From January to March of this year, Cinematheque Ontario mounted a "Tribute to R. Bruce Elder" and the department in which I teach produced a short monograph on the occasion that included a brilliant essay on *The Book of All the Dead* by Christian Roy. Dr Roy wrote this about the films in that section of the cycle that, collectively, serves as the analogue of the third *cantico* in Dante's *Commedia*:

For it was at Giverny that Monet captured the Edenic vision of a floral epiphany of Light, which propelled Elder on his own quest to film Paradise as the redemption of history with Nature, paradoxically achieved when all things are made new and strangely iconic in the digital imagery of the Risen Body, whose embrace heals the soul it merges with as a feminine erotic Presence, encompassing all the dead—past and future—in eternal Life.

I am deeply moved by Dr Roy's insight into my work. He has correctly identified the aspiration behind the "Paradiso" section of *The Book of All the Dead*. But on the matter of whether it was achieved, I beg to differ. The purpose of this essay is to explain my doubts.

There is nothing original in saying that Dante's *Commedia* is riven by competing conceptions of language. On the one hand, Dante despairs over language's revelatory powers and examples of what is commonly referred to as the ineffability *topos*.

Chi poria mai pur con parole sciolte
dicer del sangue e de le piaghe a pieno
ch' i' ora vidi, per narrar più volte?

Ogne lingua per certo verria meno
per lo nostro sermone e per la mente
e' hanno a tanto comprender poco seno.
Inferno XXVIII 1-6; Sinclair 1:346)

Who, even in words not bound by meter
and having told the tale many times
over, could tell the blood and wounds
that I saw now?

Surely every tongue would fail,
for neither thought nor speech,
has the capacity to hold so much.
(Hollander and Hollander, *Inferno* 515)

On the other hand, as Teodolinda Barolini points out in the fourth chapter of *The Undivine Comedy*, concerning this passage, Dante not only does not withhold speech, but goes on to present the mutilated combatants who have fallen on the battlefields of southern Italy (90). As Barolini also notes, the text is self-conscious “regarding its representational mission; its task is to equal in its textual mode the foul mode adopted by infernal reality, which is labeled as though it [reality] too were a genre or style, a ‘foul style’” (90).

Dante often expresses despair about conveying his greatest visions in language. But his protestations about the difficulty of the task have less to do with the impotence of language and its resistance to novel compositional forms and more to do with the fallibility of memory.

<p>Da quinci innanzi il mio veder fu maggio / che 'l parlar nostro, ch'a tal vista cede, / e cede la memoria a tanto oltraggio.</p>	<p>From that time on my power of sight exceeded / that of speech, which fails at such a vision, / as memory fails at such abundance.</p>
<p>Qual è colui che somnando vede, che dopo il sogno la passione impressa rimane, e l'altro alla mente non riede,</p>	<p>Just as the dreamer, after he awakens still stirred by feelings that the dream evoked / cannot bring the rest of it to mind,</p>
<p>cotal son io, chè quasi tutta cessa mia visione, ed ancor mi distilla nel core il dolce che nacque da essa.</p>	<p>such am I, my vision almost faded from my mind, / while in my heart there still endures /the sweetness that was born of it.</p>
<p>Così la neve al sol si disigilla; così al vento nelle foglie levi si perdea la sentenza di Sibilla. (<i>Paradiso</i> XXXIII 55–66; Sinclair 3:480)</p>	<p>Thus the sun unseals an imprint in the snow./ Thus the Sibyl's oracles, on weightless leaves, / lifted by the wind, were swept away.(Hollander and Hol- lander, <i>Paradiso</i> 911–13)</p>

On the other hand, Dante also realized that language can help make memory, just as it can help summon beings into being, and so can it enrich human beings. That is why Dante continues the above passage with an invocation to the Light to grant language and memory.

<p>O somma luce che tanto ti levi da' concetti mortali, alla mia mente ripresta un poco di quel che parevi, e fa la lingua mia tanto possente, ch' una favilla sol della tua gloria possa lasciare a la futura gente;</p>	<p>O Light exalted beyond mortal thought grant that in memory I see again but one small part of how you then ap- peared and grant my tongue sufficient power</p>
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<p>chè, per tornare alquanto a mia memoria / e per sonare un poco in questi versi, / più si conceperà di tua vittoria. (<i>Paradiso</i> XXXIII 67–75; Sinclair 3:480–82)</p>	<p>that it may leave behind a single spark of glory for the people yet to come, since, if you return but briefly to my mind / and then resound but softly in these lines, / the better will your victory be conceived. (Hollander and Hollander, <i>Paradiso</i> 913)</p>
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The exhilaration Dante experienced in refashioning poetic language is not diluted by—in fact, it depends on—the acknowledgment of the limits of language’s creative power. If it abounds in seeming avowals of ineffability, *Paradiso* abounds also in neologisms, new words created to express (formerly) inexpressible thoughts—and to bring new beings (or new spiritual forms) into being. In forging novel linguistic constructions, the poet redraws the boundaries not only of language but also of reality, thereby giving tangible proof that the difficulties of “writing paradise” (or any other realm) can be overcome. Every time Dante, *poeta*—that is, etymologically, a “maker”—coins a neologism, he achieves a victory over silence and meaninglessness. Dante’s confessions of despair only serve to highlight the power of the poetic imagination. Poetry bridges the abyss between language and reality, between language and vision, and between language and the *trasumanar*.

Dante understood that language is mutable, open to renewal by the poetic. The limits of the language we have at present (or that Dante had) are not the limits of language *per se*. That would be the case if language simply named the objects that make up the furniture of the world. But language is *poiesis*, a making-as-fostering: what language fosters is the world we experience.

Dante’s world was formed in the wake of Augustine’s visionary philosophy. For Augustine, as for other Medieval Platonists, wisdom and truth pre-exist human’s awareness of it. Truth is an order of being, a pattern that relates all things. This pattern embodies Reason and it is Reason to which beings are indebted for their being. One ascends from knowledge of shadows and illusions, through knowledge of particulars to the knowledge of the order of the cosmos and apprehends the reason why things are, *i.e.*, the cause to which things owe their being.

But the mind that knows things is not intractable: in knowing, the mind is re-formed, taking on the pattern of what it apprehends. Thus, the mind is transformed. This idea of transformation of vision had a Biblical basis: Paul, the most philosophical apostle, in Corinthians I:13, proposed that, while at present we know reality by means of a poor, an enigmatic—or, better, a riddling—reflection, a transformation of knowledge is to come and when that

transformation comes, we will see face to face (“*tunc autem facie ad faciem*” in the Vulgate).

What does Paul mean when he writes of doing away with these riddling reflections, and seeing “*facie ad faciem*”? To do away with riddling reflections is to dispense with the mistaken assumption that objects exist outside of us and are reflected, darkly, in the mirror of the mind. To begin to see “*facie ad faciem*” is to come to know the unity of subject and object. St. Augustine proposed a similar idea:

quae se quoque in me comperiens mutabilem erexit se ad intellegentiam suam et abduxit cogitationem a consuetudine, subtrahens se contradicentibus turbis phantasmatum, ut inveniret quo lumine aspergeretur, cum sine ulla dubitatione clamaret incommutabile praeferendum esse mutabili, unde nosset ipsum incommutabile (quod nisi aliquo modo nosset, nullo modo illud mutabili certa praeponeret) et pervenit ad id, quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus.¹ (*Confessiones* XIII, 17)

True knowledge involves the divine element in the soul knowing the Divine (that which is unchangeable). Augustine’s claim that the knowledge of the image of God does not come through phantasms amounts to the assertion that knowledge originates in the known (the divine), which knows itself through us. Augustine would have us believe that true knowledge (knowledge of God) originates in its object: God can bypass the human consciousness in order to put this image, this knowledge, in us unaltered.

In *De magistro* Augustine had argued that it is the word of God, the interior *magister*, that is responsible for the process of learning. Truth is what we attain through hearing the interior *magister* speak. Whatever we learn comes to us through the echoing of the word within, which activates the learning process. In the beginning, the word brought forth the world, and the same word, active within us, serves as the inner teacher and brings forth what we know. “*Ipsium est Verbum tuum, quod et principium est, quia et loquitur nobis,*” Augustine asserts (*Confessiones* XI.8).² The word makes understanding just as it made (and continues to make) reality in the first place. True understanding and reality are at one.

The doctrine of Ideas and the notion that Creation (and knowledge) follows prototypes in the mind of God are central to Thomas’ thought, too. The differences between Augustine’s and Aquinas’ epistemologies mostly arise from their differing conceptions of the light of reason: according to the *Doctor Angelicus*, in opposition to the *Doctor Gratiae*, we do not know through an illumination from outside ourselves. Instead, he judges that we know by the activity of an inherent intellectual light, a power essential to each human soul and given each by God.

The *Doctor Angelicus*, partly because of his faith commitments and partly because of his acquaintance with Aristotle's works, accorded a more expansive role to the body, the senses, and empirical particulars than Plato or Augustine did. Nonetheless, like many Medieval thinkers, Aquinas believed that human's spiritual capacities cooperate with material particulars, or with the common natures derived from the material particulars, to produce the objects that we know. Indeed, the mind acquires the forms of these objects of knowledge, and, in ascending to the highest forms of knowledge, takes on more and more attributes of the divine.

The idea reflected here, that things are known according to the mode of the knower, is another *topos* of Medieval philosophy. It appears in St. Thomas in a number of forms: "Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis"; "Quidquid est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est"; "Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis."; "Cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis." Much earlier, Boethius had expounded it in the *Consolatio Philosophiae*: "omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem" (5P4).³ Or, again, "omne iudicium secundum sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit" (5P6).⁴ The reason this became a *topos* of Medieval philosophy is that the Medieval episteme held that reality is not something external to the mind, but a fusion of mind and matter. What is implied by that claim, I contend, is a fundamental rejection of the representationalist conception of truth and knowledge. For it implies that what is known cannot be represented as something to which knowledge must be conformed, because knowledge involves a co-production of "the object" (or better, the object-emerging-in-the-process-of-being-thrown-against-knowing-being); so the object, as known-being, does not pre-exist the act of knowing—it comes into being in the act of knowing. The basis for Dante's (and Augustine's) complaint that there can be no image of the thing known, an aspect of the ineffability *topos*, is the understanding that known-being emerges in the act of knowing (whose content can be represented in language), and when the act of cognition has ended, that known-being, *strictu sensu*, has escaped.

Knowing depends on some type of connaturality between subject and object; in comprehending an object, the subject is, in some sense, conformed to the object. Further, love has a role: humans long to understand the Whole, to grasp the connections amongst things and their causes. This wonder ultimately leads us to God. There is still a lingering Platonism in Aquinas, and the Platonic tradition in metaphysics maintains that Beauty colludes with Truth, the Good with Understanding, and Love with Knowledge, to draw the mind onward. The desire of God (both God's desire for us and ours for God)

is the active element in knowledge. Aquinas understood that conceptual thinking, which is allied with reflection, is not an act of a mind severed from a body, from the senses and from emotions. Knowing is a full human act and is animated by love and the desire to be united with the object of knowledge. In its ultimate form it is united with the ultimate object of knowledge, that is to say, with God. The search for truth leads towards God and culminates in an apprehension of the Divine.

Every judgment is an affirmation that draws us towards the end of Truth, which is the knowledge of everything. It is to the end of attaining union that the soul engages in reflection and abstracts a common nature from the sensuous particular. "Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia, tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsam formam per se" (*S.T. I. q. 12 a 4 ad 3*).⁵ What Aquinas says next is remarkable: "Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens."⁶

The mind participates with particulars to realize these common natures. What is more, the mind, because it operates according to the principles of the intellect, of which the Divine Intellect is the exemplar, forms particulars in a manner consistent with God's understanding, and so with the ordinances of being. The object that is thrown against the mind in coming to knowledge is the idea in the mind of God. Things, then, are no different than thought. The adequation of the intellect to things is the conformity of the human intellect to ideas in the divine intellect, the *similitudo* of human thought and divine creativity, whose very emblem is the Word.

Thus, each affirmation leads to a higher question, and apprehending the answer to that question leads to a yet higher question. In the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas refers to "plenam participationem divinitatis, quae vere est hominis beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae" (*S.T. III. q. 1 a 2*).⁷ This spiritual *itinerarium* is actually conceived by Aquinas as an ascent toward deiformity. Thomas maintained a version of the idea that now is known only in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, of *theosis* or "divinization"—the *Doctor Angelicus* way of describing that result is to say that one becomes "deiform."

I am aware this does not sound much like the familiar Aquinas. But I believe Aquinas himself does not sound much like the familiar Aquinas.

Facultas autem videndi Deum non competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam, sed per lumen gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate constituit [...]. Unde intellectus plus participans de lumine gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem participabit de lumine gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate, quia ubi est maior caritas, ibi est maius de-

siderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior erit. (*S.T. I. q. 12 a 5*)⁸

We ascend the ladder of understanding, from discursive apprehension (understood as “dis-currere,” or the mind running around, from premise to conclusion to next conclusion) to the simple act of intellectual vision as the mind conforming itself to (i.e., according to the Neo-Platonic strand in his thinking, participating in) thinking that is closer to deiform: “Unde, quamvis cognitio humanae animae proprie sit per viam rationis, est tamen in ea aliqua participatio illius simplicis cognitionis quae in superioribus substantiis invenitur, ex quo etiam intellectivam vim habere dicuntur” (*Quaes. disp. de Veritate*, Q. XV, a 1. resp).⁹ And since things are, in essence, objects of divine intellect, in conforming itself to (or taking on attributes of) the divine intellect, the mind comes to apprehend the truth of being.

The *Doctor Angelicus*’ epistemology (and soteriology) dispenses with the distinction between the realms of nature and grace, as with that between natural reason and revealed truth. The light of any thing is the radiance and clarity that comes from its intelligibility, which follows from its being a *creatura*, brought forth first in the mind of God: “Ipsa actualitas rei est quoddam lumen ipsius” (*Super librum De causis expositio* I. 6).¹⁰ Grace attends all our knowledge, for grace is required even for the most ordinary activities of human reason. Dante embraced this notion, indeed taking its implications to the extreme.

Dante, too, maintained that all knowledge requires divine illumination and all knowledge is akin to the experience of light flooding the intellect with love; indeed, he radicalized this belief by connecting the idea of knowledge of co-production with another, that of the creative word, founded in the comparison between the Creator’s making and the inspired poet’s making. The strong poet, truly inspired, knows intimately the higher truths he writes about, because he knows them as their co-maker. He participates in the divine *energeia*, which, at every moment of its existence, maintains each existent in being. Dante’s many expressions of doubt about his capacity to convey particular experiences to the reader are really invocations to the creator spirit to come and fill his mind with love. He calls out for the *incendium amoris* to bring him knowledge.

The *Commedia* (as I have noted) is a remarkably self-referential work, one that frequently comments on, or otherwise highlights, its methods and reflects on its language. For Dante, as for Augustine, the consideration of language is deeply connected to other aspects of the system of knowledge. Time and again, Dante demonstrates that the divinely charged word can serve as an adequate symbol—it can do so because its task is not simply to

mediate between consciousness and reality, but includes giving reality form. Knowing is an act of *poiesis* through which the mind brings forth what it knows even as what is known gives form to the mind: the thing made guides the act of making even as the act of making brings to pass what is made.

Analogous, too, I argue, is the work of language. When we speak (or think) we engage in *poiesis*: our language brings reality into being even as our language use is guided by reality. Medieval readers expected a philosophical or theological text to have this transformative effect, and Medieval writers consciously crafted their work to provide it. Philosophers intended their writings to be more than expository treatises; they were to provoke spiritual exercises. The reader who reflected upon the patterns of meaning embedded in these works would rise to a deeper understanding of divine truths, and so to a heightened awareness of God's presence.

But how should we understand the three-termed analogy of language, creativity and truth on which this conception is based? Truth is harmony and coherence (in the sense of an integrated pattern); knowing the truth brings the mind to a harmony that is regulated by the same principles as those to which beings owe their being. This harmony suffuses the mind with joy. We experience joy in apprehending the creative principle to which all that exists owes its being.

The universal good people seek in life is joy: the joy the happy life universally seeks must be joy in the truth. Thus, the true and greatest joy (Augustine, *inter alia*, argues) is joy in God. Even those who do not seek God nonetheless are drawn toward an image of this true joy. The obstacle to realizing this goal of experiencing joy is lack of will.

Hence, the soul, in some sense, participates in God's creative acts of self-knowing. That was the basis of Aquinas' epistemology. That luminous insight was swept away with the Enlightenment. Descartes lays down the fundamental principle that produced that effect: ideas are true precisely to the extent that they can be derived from reason itself. The clarity and distinctness of ideas that Descartes takes to be the criteria of their truth derive from the immediacy with which they are related to the pure thought of the ego. That is the difference between the Medieval world and the modern world of Nicholas of Cusa or René Descartes.

Kant too affirms the principle that ideas are true precisely to the extent that they can be derived from reason itself. Regarding the question of revelation, Kant's integration of empiricism does not bring him in any significant sense beyond Descartes: critical philosophy determines the subject's conditions of possibility prior to any encounter with what lies outside of the subject.

Only that which can be received within the understanding's *a priori* con-

ditions is intelligible. What lies beyond these conditions simply cannot be received. Everything that is ordered in one's experience, which means everything accessible to the soul's perceptive and cognitive powers, is simply the product of the soul's spontaneous formal and categorial activity; what comes from outside the soul is nothing but the matter to be shaped by this activity. The world is not ultimately what one understands; rather, it occasions acts of understanding. The world turns out to be reason's encounter with itself: "die wahre Erhabenheit nur im Gemüte des Urteilenden, nicht in der Naturobjekte, dessen Beurteilung diese Stimmung desselben veranlaßt, müsse gesucht werden" (*Kritik der Urteilskraft* 121).¹¹

The Medieval world, by way of contrast, understood the highest form of knowledge as in-breaking of the radically Other. To say with Thomas that truth arises as co-production between the knowing agent and being itself, and to say that truth as known-being must be fitted to the constitution of the intellect, is to assert that consciousness is the world manifesting itself in the known agent. The intellect is fitted for transcendence (in the phenomenological sense of the word). The self is fitted to make contact with the world and in fact arises (insofar as the self can be identified with consciousness) only through the contact with the world.

The distinguished theologian Hans Balthasar recognized that two great truths are contained in that insight: 1) that an *otherness* abides in every act of knowing, even though every act of knowing is a fusion of the knower and the known; 2) that the other engenders us. The model, as Balthasar again pointed out, is "The little child awaken[ing] to self-consciousness through being addressed by the love of his mother" (15–55).

Knowledge was no longer understood this way after Kant: what looks like the in-breaking of the radically Other is, in fact, the moment of the purest introspection. For Kant, reason, by its very nature, cannot be moved by its other. Kant explicitly declares that genuine supernatural revelation is impossible: it sounds questionable, he says, but it is in no way reprehensible to say that everyone makes his own God (*Religion* 157). Kant makes the claim because, he argues, we would not be able to recognize the revealed God as God unless he corresponded to our *a priori* notion of what it means to be God. For Kant, revealed religion has value only insofar as it aids in the understanding of natural religion, *i.e.*, religion determined by reason's immanent horizon.

How, indeed, can reason have a capacity for what lies beyond its capacity? Dante had an answer. People living in the Classical and Medieval period had an answer. We have none. The poetic language of *Paradiso*, taken as a whole, is exultant rather than diffident about its own claims to mean, refer, and express; and it founds those claims on a self-confident estimation of its

own authority, deriving directly from its author's literary practice and theological beliefs. In Dante's cosmology, language and thought are on intimate terms with one another—like thinking, the word is world-creating/world-disclosing.

What about cinema? The cinematic apparatus, I contend, has built into it the suppositions of the modern era, in which truth is understood as a representation. Digital imagery is different in that respect. The attraction of the digital image, for me, was that it seemed to resemble the image formed in cognition, an image in which engendering and perception were at one.

Of course, that belief was simply false. As Heidegger notes: "Zu dem, was die Technik ist, gehört das Verfertigen und Benützen von Zeug, Gerät und Maschinen, gehört dieses Verfertigte und Benützte selbst, gehören die Bedürfnisse und Zwecke, denen sie dienen" ("Die Frage" 14).¹² Heidegger is right in saying that the triumph of metaphysics—the positing of static and unitary conceptions of Being over those of Being as co-production Being—has obscured Being. Conceiving of the digital as *poiesis* was bound to fail. Heidegger distinguished four ways beings are indebted for the being: *causa materialis*, *causa formalis*, *causa finalis* and *causa efficiens*. In the digital realm, the *causa materialis* has been all but eliminated; material has been replaced by the virtual (for what is new about the digital realm is that what is virtual no longer belongs to the category of illusory form; here the virtual has come to supplant the material). The *causa formalis* no longer is any gathering together to be a whole, but rather is an appearance imposed by the technological system. The *causa finalis* no longer derives from "wheels revolving with an even motion, turning with the love that moves the sun and all the other stars," for the inventor mind is no longer drawn by Love to the Whole. As for the *causa efficiens*, that is the worst of it: a great poet once wrote, "Usura rusteth the chisel/It rusteth the craft and the craftsman." Here, at least, he spoke the truth. Substitute the technical system for "usura"—it is not such a far-fetched substitution, since usury concerns the phantasmal production of money—and you know all you need about how craft (and the craftsperson) have been remade.

It was all predictable: the effort to rewrite the end of the *Commedia* into film is bound to fail. And fail I did. That is the bitter truth. Dante knew about the sort of co-production that the ancients called *poiesis*. We, moderns, do not.

Notes

¹ And when this power of reason within found that it was changeable, it raised itself up to its own intellectual principle, and withdrew its thoughts from experience, at-

abstracted itself from the contradictory throng of phantasms in order to seek for that light in which it is bathed. Then, without any doubting, it cried out that the unchangeable is better than the changeable. From this it follows that the mind somehow knew the unchangeable, for, unless it had known it in some fashion, it could have had no sure ground for preferring it to the changeable. And thus with the flash of a trembling glance, it arrived at that which is.

² This is Thy Word, which is also “the Beginning,” because also It speaketh unto us.

³ For every subject, that which is known, is comprehended not according to its own force, but rather according to the nature of those who know it.

⁴ All judgment apprehends the subjects of its thought according to its own nature.

⁵ Now although it knows things that have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself.

⁶ Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.

⁷ that the goal of life is “full participation in divinity which is humankind’s true beatitude and the destiny of human life”

⁸ The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of “deiformity” [...]. Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified

⁹ Consequently, although the knowledge proper to the human soul takes place through the process of reasoning, nevertheless, it participates to some extent in that simple knowledge which exists in higher substances, and because of which they are said to have intellective power.

¹⁰ The reality of things is itself their light.

¹¹ True sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging person, not in the natural object the judging of which prompts this mental attunement.

¹² The manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends they serve, all belong to what technology is.

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